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PROHIBITING JURORS FROM WORKING
AS TRIAL CONSULTANTS IN RETRIALS: A

CAREFUL BALANCING ACT BETWEEN
THE FIRST AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you have just been selected for jury duty in the retrial
of a high-profile defendant. You are aware that after the first trial
resulted in a mistrial, members of the jury were approached by the
defense lawyer and asked to work as trial consultants in the retrial.
They received fifty dollars per hour as compensation for their consulting
services, in addition to a five hundred dollar retainer fee. You are
currently unemployed and receive twelve dollars per hour as
compensation for serving as a juror. When the time comes to
deliberate, would the knowledge that you could receive fifty dollars per
hour to work as a trial consultant in the event that the case ends in a
mistrial influence you to change your vote?
The District Attorney of Orange County, California, and two
California state legislators say "yes"-the possibility of a juror
intentionally creating a mistrial to secure work as a consultant in the
retrial is very real.' To combat this threat, they proposed the Jury
Integrity Act, which would make it a crime for a former juror to receive
compensation for working as a trial consultant in a retrial Although
the bill died in committee, the issue of lawyers hiring former jurors to
work as trial consultants in retrials has sparked debate within the legal
community and raised serious legal and ethical questions
1. The Orange County District Attorney, Tony Rackauckas, along with former
California State Assemblyman Lou Correa, D-Santa Ana, and California State Senator Dick
Ackerman, R-Tustin, have adamantly opposed the practice of lawyers hiring former jurors to
work as trial consultants in retrials. See Rachanee Srisavasdi, DA Opposes Paying Ex-Jurors
To Consult, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 20, 2004, at Locall. Rackauckas has referred to
this strategy as "an outrageous attack on the integrity of the jury system." Id.
2. H.R. 473, 2003-2004 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (proposed amendment to
CAL. PENAL CODE § 116.5), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.govfbillinfo.html.

3. See Diane Curtis, Paying Jurors: Savvy Trial Strategy-Or Attack On The Jury
System?, CAL. B. J., Jan. 2005, at 1 (discussing the legal and ethical issues raised by lawyers
hiring former jurors to work as trial consultants in retrials).
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Many lawyers are surprised to learn that other lawyers have hired

former jurors to work as trial consultants in retrials.4 Their reactions are
mixed: while some view it as a good strategy,' others view it as bordering
on unethical.6 The controversy surrounding the issue of lawyers hiring

former jurors to work as trial consultants in retrials is not new; in fact, it
began more than two decades ago. 7 In a high-profile 1985 Connecticut
rape case, a defense lawyer hired a former juror to consult in the retrial

of his client, causing a stir in the legal community." In response, the
Connecticut Legislature passed a state law prohibiting jurors from
accepting compensation for working as trial consultants in retrials.9

Until recently, the issue has not received much attention. ' ° Last
summer, however, the defense lawyer in a high-profile California rape
case hired several former jurors to work as trial consultants in the

retrial, once again stirring up controversy and inspiring the introduction
of the Jury Integrity Act." Several years earlier, a California law that
4. See Stephanie Francis Ward, Former Jurors To Be Consultants-Defense is Hiring
Them For Help in Gang-Rape Retrial,30 A.B.A. J. E. REP., July 30, 2004, at 2 (interviewing
several lawyers who consider it a "novel" strategy). The author is unaware of any studies
addressing the breadth of the problem.
5. Curtis, supra note 3, at 1 (noting one Los Angeles attorney who has called the
strategy "'brilliant lawyering that is consistent with defense lawyer duties' to do everything
possible to defend their clients").
6. Id. (interviewing several legal ethics professors who have expressed concern about the
possible negative effects of paying former jurors to work as trial consultants in retrials).
7. See George Gombossy, Ex-Juror Retained as Trial Consultant, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 30,
1985, at 3.
8. For a "nominal fee," defense lawyer Michael Sherman hired one of the jurors who
had voted for acquittal in the first trial to consult in the second trial. Although his client was
ultimately found guilty, Sherman stated that using the juror was still "worthwhile." See
Gombossy, supra note 7, at 3.
9. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-247(b) (West 2005). This Connecticut State Law
became known as the "Sherman Act," named after defense lawyer Michael Sherman.
Leonard Post, Hiring Former Jurors as Trial Consultants Catches On, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16,
2004, at 6.
10. The issue of lawyers hiring former jurors to work as trial consultants in retrials last
received media attention in a 1999 Florida murder case. When that case ended in a hung jury,
one of the jurors, a lawyer who was convinced that the defendant was innocent, offered to
work with the defense without compensation. The defendant was later acquitted after the
lawyer/former juror helped the defense poke holes in the prosecution's evidence. Michael D.
Goldhaber, Thinking Out of the Jury Box: Lawyer-Juroron Hung PanelJoins the Defense for
Retrial,NAT'L L.J., July 26, 1999, at Al.
11. The background of this high-profile California rape case is as follows: Gregory
Haidl, the seventeen-year-old son of a wealthy Orange County, California, Assistant Sheriff,
and two of his friends, allegedly gang-raped an unconscious sixteen-year-old girl and
videotaped it. After a two-month trial, the jury deadlocked. Eight former jurors then
worked as trial consultants for the defense in the retrial, as well as professional trial
consultant Jo Ellen Dimitrius, who served as a trial consultant in both the O.J. Simpson
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banned all post-verdict contact with jurors had been struck down as
unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment right to free
speech. 12 Unlike that previous law, the Jury Integrity Act would have

regulated lawyers' post-verdict contact with jurors in a manner that
would have protected both criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment
rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury" and lawyers' and jurors' First
Amendment right to free speech.'

This Comment, beginning with Part II, offers a brief overview of the
role of trial consultants in trial preparation, explaining who trial
consultants most often are and what services they provide. Part III
discusses two general criticisms of trial consulting: (1) it interferes with
criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and an
impartial jury; and (2) it contributes to public distrust in the jury system.
Part IV will then discuss additional criticisms that are particular to
lawyers hiring former jurors to work as trial consultants in retrials. Part
V will examine two state laws intended to prohibit lawyers from hiring

former jurors to work as trial consultants in retrials and explain why
California's broad ban on post-trial juror contact was overturned on
constitutional grounds while Connecticut's specific ban is still good law
today. Finally, Part VI will recommend that all states adopt a law
similar to California's proposed Jury Integrity Act, prohibiting former

jurors from accepting any form of compensation to work as trial
consultants, but giving them the option to do so without compensation.
This proposed rule effectively balances the constitutional rights of all

those affected in several respects. On the one hand, it protects lawyers'
and jurors' First Amendment right to free speech by giving former

jurors the option of working with lawyers as trial consultants in retrials
criminal trial and the Scott Peterson trial. Post, supra note 9, at 6. The former jurors
received fifty dollars per hour plus a five hundred dollar retainer fee for their consulting
services. Curtis, supra note 3, at 1. In retaliation, the prosecution hired its own trial
consultant. Rachanee Srisavasdi, Consultant Aids DA in Haidl Case, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Feb. 1, 2005, at Local2. On March 23, 2005, the jury found the defendants guilty of
sexual assault. Ben Fox, 3 Found Guilty in OC Sex Case, DAILY BREEZE, March 24, 2005, at
A7. Sentencing is expected in fall 2005. Claire Luna, Gang-Sex Sentence Delayed Until Fall,
L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2005, at B3.
12. See Dove Audio, Inc. v. Lungren, No. CV 95-2570 RG (JRX), 1995 WL 432631, at *2
(C.D. Cal. June 14, 1995) (holding that section 116.5 of the California Penal Code as it
applied to jurors was overbroad and not necessary to serve a compelling state interest).
13. U.S. CONT. amend. VI (providing, in relevant part, that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed").
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing, in relevant part, that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press").
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without compensation.
On the other hand, it protects criminal
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury
by eliminating a potential profit motive for jurors to intentionally
deadlock and create a mistrial to secure a consulting job in the retrial.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE TRIAL CONSULTING INDUSTRY

The trial consulting industry first emerged in high-profile political
trials of the early 1970s.15 In those cases, defense lawyers representing
anti-war activists hired social scientists to work as trial consultants. 6
Today, trial consulting is a multi-million dollar industry.17 Not only do
large corporations now use trial consultants on a regular basis, wealthy
criminal and civil defendants, including several notable celebrities, do as
well. 18
While trial consultants are most often psychologists, they may also
be sociologists, lawyers, people with communications or marketing
backgrounds, or people with no formal training at all. 9 Traditionally, a
trial consultant's role was limited to assisting in voir dire. ° Today,
however, trial consultants may provide lawyers with advice on anything
from voir dire to actual trial strategy.2' Some of the services that trial
consultants have been known to provide include producing visual aids,
preparing witnesses, drafting prospective juror questionnaires,
conducting focus groups and mock trials, completing community
15. Maureen E. Lane, Twelve Carefully Selected Not So Angry Men: Are Jury
Consultants Destroying the American Legal System?, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 463, 472 (1999).
16. See id. (citing United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973) as an example of
such a trial).
17. Lane, supra note 15, at 472 n.70.
18. Franklin Strier, Paying the Piper: Proposed Reforms of the Increasingly Bountiful
But ControversialProfession of Trial Consulting, 44 S.D. L. REV. 699, 700 n.8 (1998) (noting
that trial consultants have been credited with helping to achieve favorable outcomes in many
high-profile cases, such as the O.J. Simpson criminal trial, the Rodney King trial, the
Menendez Brothers trial, the trial of New York "subway vigilante" Bernard Goetz, and the
McDonald's "hot coffee" trial).
19. Franklin Strier & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the Profilers: A Study of the Trial
Consulting Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice and What, If Anything, To Do About It,
1999 Wis. L. REV. 441, 445 (1999). See Diana G. Ratcliff, Using Trial Consultants: What
PractitionersNeed to Know, 4 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 32, 34 n.17 (2002) (noting that in a
2001 Alabama murder case, the prosecution's consulting team included a screenwriter who
helped tell the story to the jury).
20. Stephanie Leonard Yarbrough, The Jury Consultant-Friendor Foe of Justice, 54
SMU L. REV. 1885, 1888 (2001).
21. See Lane, supra note 15, at 473-74 (noting that "jury selection consultants employ a
variety of 'scientific jury selection methods' derived from the social sciences").
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surveys, and handling settlement discussions. Whatever their function
in a particular case, trial consultants have increasingly come under fire
from members of the legal community for a variety of reasons discussed
below in Part III.
III. CRITICISMS OF TRIAL CONSULTANTS

Some lawyers consider trial consultants to be an absolutely essential

element of trial preparation, especially in high-profile cases. 3 Other
lawyers question the effectiveness of trial consultants, likening them to
"security blanket[s]" for lawyers who "are always worried about the
outcome of a case.

24

And other lawyers criticize trial consulting as an

"unethical" practice that interferes with criminal defendants'
constitutional rights. 5 While some of these criticisms apply to lawyers'

hiring trial consultants in general, other criticisms specifically apply to

lawyers' hiring former jurors to work as trial consultants in retrials.
A. Criticisms of Trial Consultantsin General

There are two main criticisms of lawyers hiring trial consultants in
general. First, some critics argue that the practice interferes with
criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and an
impartial jury.26 Second, other critics argue that trial consultants

contribute to public distrust in the jury system and in the court system in
general.27

22. Yarbrough, supra note 20, at 1889-95.
23. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 19, at 443. For example, one Boston trial lawyer
commented that "[n]o self-respecting trial lawyer will go through the process of jury selection
in an important case without the assistance of highly paid trial consultants." Id. at 443 n.2
(alteration in original) (quoting Gordon T. Walker). Similarly, a New York lawyer
commented that "[i]t's gotten to the point where if the case is large enough, it's almost
malpractice not to use [trial consultants]." Id.
24. Pamela Griner Leavy & Krista Reiner, Lawyers Use Trial Consultants to Fine-Tune
Tough Cases, TAMPA BAY Bus. J., May 26, 2000, at 15.
25. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 19, at 474.
26. Id. at 474-75.
27. Debra Stahler, Scientifically Selecting Jurors While Maintaining Professional
Responsibility: A Proposed Model Rule, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 383, 398-99 (1996); Strier
& Shestowsky, supra note 19, at 472-73, 478.
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1. Right to a Fair Trial and an Impartial Jury
One of the main criticisms of trial consulting is that it interferes with
criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and an
impartial jury. Critics have suggested that trial consulting interferes
with these rights because its excessive costs make it available only to the
wealthy.29 Trial consultants have been known to cost as much as one
million dollars in some high-profile cases. ° Thus, critics argue that the
exorbitant costs of trial consulting, combined with the exorbitant costs
of hiring lawyers, investigators, and expert witnesses, results in the
wealthy enjoying a substantial advantage in criminal trials, thus
interfering with criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair
trial and an impartial jury."
This criticism, however, is not so much a criticism of trial consulting
per se as it is a criticism of the economic realities of our legal system in
general.3 2 Trial consulting advocates argue that the entire legal system is
flawed: the fact that only the wealthy can afford to hire trial consultants
is no less fair than the fact that only the wealthy can afford to hire more
lawyers, investigators, and expert witnesses.3 Trial consulting advocates
argue that the critics should consider the "big picture" and keep in mind
that there are many flaws inherent in our legal system. These flaws, in
addition to the "novel" strategies employed by some trial consultants,
have contributed to a general public distrust in the jury system and in
the court system in general.35

28. Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 19, at 474-75.
29. Strier & Shestowsky raise two questions: (1) "Does allowing government, large
corporations, and wealthy individuals to have such an advantage over their opponents
undermine the very foundation of a fair trial?"; and (2) "Might not the resulting competitive
disadvantages of poorer litigants have a chilling effect on the exercise of their constitutional
rights?" Id. at 474.
30. Harvey Moore, owner of Trial Practices, a trial consulting firm in Tampa Bay,
Florida, typically charges $6500 for a focus group, $20,000 for a mock trial, and up to
$1,000,000 for a variety of services in larger cases. Leavy & Reiner, supra note 24, at 15.
31. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 19, at 475-76.
32. See id. at 475 (noting that "what is 'unfair' about trial consulting is a metaphor for

what is unfair about the adversary system as a whole").
33. See id. at 475-76.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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2. Public Perception and Trust in the Jury System
A second criticism of trial consulting is that it contributes to a
general public distrust in the jury system. 36 Critics argue that the public
views juries as "manipulated by psychological devices" and views trial
consulting as "high-tech jury tampering."37 In addition, claims by trial
consultants that they have the ability to control the outcome of cases
have contributed to the public's perception that lawyers can, and often
do, manipulate the jury and disregard defendants' constitutional rights."
Critics also argue that the fact that trial consulting is an unregulated
industry contributes to public distrust in the jury system.39 There are

neither licensing requirements to become a trial consultant nor
Because there are no
continuing education requirements.40
requirements to become a trial consultant, some critics argue that it is
inevitable that "untrained, incompetent, and unscrupulous individuals
[will] advertise and practice with impunity., 41 Thus, they argue, the trial
consulting industry is open to scam artists who promote themselves by
making unrealistic promises and claims.42 Not only does this result in
public distrust in the jury system, but also potential harm to criminal
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury.
These two criticisms also extend to lawyers hiring former jurors to work
as trial consultants in retrials.
B. Criticisms of Lawyers Hiring FormerJurorsto Work as Trial
Consultantsin Retrials

Many of the criticisms of lawyers hiring former jurors to work as
trial consultants in retrials include the same criticisms discussed above
concerning trial consultants in general. 43 There are three potential
criticisms, however, that are unique to the practice of lawyers hiring

36. Id. at 472-73 (noting that the "appearance of justice is as important as the reality in
order to preserve and maintain public support for an instrument or an institution of justice").
37. Id.

38. Stahler, supra note 27, at 398-99 (arguing that trial consultants' jury selection
methods erode the impartial jury requirement of the Sixth Amendment).
39. Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 19, at 478.
40. Id.
41. Id.

42. Strier, supra note 18, at 703.
43. See supra Part III.A.1-2.
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former jurors to work as trial consultants in retrials." First, this practice
interferes with freedom of debate during jury deliberations. Second, it
interferes with jurors' rights to privacy. And finally, it gives jurors a
profit motive to intentionally deadlock and create a mistrial, thereby
violating criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.45
1. Freedom of Debate During Jury Deliberations
One potential criticism of lawyers hiring former jurors to work as
trial consultants in retrials is that it may interfere with freedom of
debate during jury deliberations. An established part of the jury system
is that the jury deliberates in private, the purpose of which is to
encourage free debate. 4 Justice Cardozo reflected on the importance of
private deliberations and jury secrecy when he stated that "[f]reedom of
debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors
were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely
published to the world. ' 47 Freedom of debate has also been said to
"promote good group dynamics within a jury, whereby jury members
exchange ideas and concerns to reach a verdict that reflects community
mores." 48 Human nature suggests that a juror is less likely to make an
argument during deliberations that may be embarrassing or dangerous if
he or she believes that other jurors may expose that argument to
someone else. 9
Thus, allowing jurors to expose private jury
44. These potential criticisms that are unique to lawyers hiring former jurors to work as
trial consultants in retrials are based in part on other commentators' criticisms of juror postverdict contact with the media.
45. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 3, at 1 (quoting a legal ethics professor who notes that
"[i]f there is the possibility of an economic reward at the end of a trial[,] ... 'this is a
motivation that makes [him] believe [that jurors are] not going to be fair and impartial');
Ward, supra note 4, at 2 (quoting Tony Rackauckas, the district attorney of Orange County,
who notes that "[i]f it got to be common for one party or another to hire jurors from a case,
that would be bad because it would put in a financial motive for jurors to vote in a certain
way").
46. Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Postverdict
Interviews, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 295, 295-96 (1993). Goldstein has suggested that although
the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly stated that juror privacy and freedom of debate
during deliberations are "integral" to the jury trial, a "group of practices and doctrines has
evolved over the years that would be mustered in support of such a conclusion." Id. at 297.
This includes "limiting impeachment of jury verdicts, favoring a general verdict, and
overlooking inconsistency in jury verdicts." Id.
47. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
48. Alison Markovitz, Jury Secrecy During Deliberations, 110 YALE L.J. 1493, 1507
(2001).
49. See William R. Bagley, Jr., Jury Room Secrecy: Has the Time Come to Unlock the
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deliberations to others can potentially interfere with criminal
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury.
Some critics have argued that jurors should be considered
''government employees," a group whose rights to freedom of debate
courts have placed great importance on protecting.5 Assuming that
jurors are considered "government employees" while serving jury duty,
their speech can be restricted when it is "disruptive to the workplace."51
In determining whether it is "disruptive to the workplace," courts can
consider "whether the employee's speech undermined the authority of
superiors, disturbed harmony among colleagues, interfered with regular
operations, impaired the employee's performance of his or her duties, or
had a detrimental impact on the close working relationships for which
loyalty and confidence are necessary." 2 Thus, one could argue that the
possibility of jurors discussing deliberations with the public, or with
lawyers post-trial, would "disturb the harmony" among the jurors
during deliberations and detrimentally impact the relationships between
them.53 The result is a paradox: restricting post-verdict contact with
jurors may interfere with jurors' First Amendment right to free speech,
but it also encourages free speech in the jury deliberation room. 4 In
addition to encouraging free speech and freedom of debate during jury
deliberations, restricting post-verdict contact with jurors also protects
juror privacy.
2. Juror Privacy Issues
A second potential criticism of lawyers hiring former jurors to work
as trial consultants in retrials is that lawyers who request information
from former jurors may interfere with jurors' right to privacy. The right
Door?,32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 481, 500-01 (1999); Markovitz, supra note 48, at 1507.
50. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (holding that the district
attorney's questionnaire was so disruptive to the regular operations of the office that her
discharge did not violate the First Amendment); Dicks v. City of Flint, 684 F. Supp. 934, 94041 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (holding that a deputy city administrator who violated a mayor's
policies could be denied a position in the mayor's administration without violating the First
Amendment).
51. Nancy S. Marder, Deliberationsand Disclosures:A Study of Post-Verdict Interviews
of Jurors, 82 IOWA L. REV. 465, 520-21 (1997) (noting that "it is unclear how to categorize
jurors for the purposes of First Amendment analysis," and questioning whether "jurors [are]
like other government employees whose speech can be constrained by virtue of their jobs").
52. Id. at 521.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 522 (noting that "the First Amendment may be most fully realized when
individual juror speech is curtailed").
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to privacy has historically been considered one of the most important.5
Jurors' right to privacy issues are often raised in the context of postverdict interviews of jurors by the media. 6 In some high-profile cases,
the media has interfered with'jurors' right to privacy by going to great
extremes to interview former jurors. 7 Oftentimes, these high-profile
cases are extremely long or emotionally draining, and jurors are eager to
get back to their normal lives. 8 Just as the media often interferes with
jurors' right to privacy by seeking post-verdict interviews, lawyers may
interfere with this right by seeking information from jurors to assist
them in the retrial.
Jurors' right to privacy issues are also raised when one juror
discusses with someone else another juror's arguments during
deliberations. 9 If a juror chooses to speak with the media, a lawyer, or
anyone else, concerning another juror's argument during deliberations,
he or she may jeopardize that other juror's right to privacy, especially if
referring to that juror by name. 6° Individual juror's arguments during
deliberations are similar to the private communications between
members of the Supreme Court and between law clerks and other court
personnel.6" Just as the First Amendment does not allow the media the
right to the private communications between members of the court and
their employees, it does not allow the media or lawyers the right to
private communications between jurors.62
3. Profit Motive to Intentionally Create a Mistrial
The most common criticism of lawyers hiring former jurors to work
as trial consultants in retrials is that it gives jurors a profit motive to
55. The right of personal privacy, that is, "the right to be let alone" has been called "the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
56. Markovitz, supra note 48, at 1506 (noting that current discussions of post-verdict jury
secrecy are largely focused on intrusions by the media).
57. See Marder, supra note 51, at 488-89 (citing several instances in high-profile trials
where jurors were forced to leave town, call the police, or take other steps to avoid
harassment by the media).
58. Id. at 505.
59. See United States v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133, 1142 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (noting that
"[i]t is very possible for one juror to engage in post-trial violations of the privacy of
another"); see also Marder, supra note 51, at 489.
60. See Marder, supra note 51, at 505.
61. Franklin,546 F. Supp. at 1143.
62. See id.
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intentionally deadlock and create a mistrial to secure a consulting job in
the retrial. 63 This fear was the basis of the recently proposed Jury
Integrity Act in California that would have prohibited jurors from
accepting compensation for trial consulting in retrials. 64 The idea of
jurors intentionally deadlocking and creating a mistrial to secure a
consulting job in the retrial is not inconceivable. Jurors in high-profile
cases have often taken advantage of opportunities to profit in what has
been labeled "checkbook journalism."65 Some jurors have held press
conferences, written books, sold their stories to the press, and appeared
on news programs or on talk shows.66 Thus, some critics argue that
jurors could intentionally create a verdict that would make a "good
ending" to the case to benefit from the publicity,67 just as jurors could
intentionally create a verdict that would allow them to benefit
financially by working as trial consultants in the retrial. 6 Not only
would jurors intentionally deadlocking and creating a mistrial violate
public policy, it would also interfere with criminal defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury.
The profit motive that jurors now have to intentionally deadlock and

63. See Curtis, supra note 3, at 1; Gombossy, supra note 7, at 6; Post, supra note 9, at 6;
Srisavasdi, supra note 1, at Locall; Ward, supra note 4, at 2.
64. Orange County District Attorney Tony Rackauckas, who proposed the Jury
Integrity Act, has stated the following:
I don't agree that [the defense] hired [the former jurors] for the purpose
of learning about the issues of the trial or for their expertise. I think the
reason they're doing it is that they want to signal to the next jury that if
you vote in favor of Gregory Haidl, you can get on the Haidl payroll.
Ward, supra note 4, at 2.
65. Copernicus T. Gaza, Getting Inside the Jury's Head: Media Access to Jurors After the
Trial, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311, 335 (1995). The origin of the term "checkbook
journalism" is unknown. James R. Cady, Bouncing "Checkbook Journalism:" A Balance
Between the First and Sixth Amendments in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 671, 671 n.2 (1996).
66. Gaza, supra note 65, at 335-36 (citing two examples of jurors benefiting from the
publicity: (1) the Bernard Goetz "subway vigilante" case, in which two jurors were paid $2500
and another was paid $5000 for their stories; and (2) the Pennzoil-Texaco case, in which a
juror wrote a book defending the ten billion dollar award and received an advance of $10,000
from his publisher).
67. See id. at 336. But see Nicole B. Casarez, Examining the Evidence: Post-Verdict
Interviews and the Jury System, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 499, 554 (2003) (arguing
that there is "no evidence, nor do critics provide any, that a juror has ever changed the
outcome of a case, disregarded probative evidence, or successfully arranged to be chosen for
jury service to further his or her commercial interests").
68. See Curtis, supra note 3, at 1; Gombossy, supra note 7, at 6; Post, supra note 9, at 6;
Srisavasdi, supra note 1, at Locall; Ward, supra note 4, at 2.

MARQUETTE LA WRE VIEW

[89:179

create mistrials poses another problem: Assuming that the practice of
lawyers hiring former jurors to work as trial consultants in retrials
catches on, what would be the next step?69 One commentator has
suggested that a "bidding war" could potentially result, whereby the

district attorney would offer to pay the former juror more money than
the defense lawyer, the defense lawyer would make a counteroffer, and
so on.70 Not only would this result be contrary to public policy, it would

stretch the already limited resources of the court and add to the public's
distrust in the jury system and in the court system in general.
Nevertheless, some commentators still argue that allowing lawyers to
hire former jurors to work as trial consultants in retrials is beneficial to
society.
C. PotentialBenefits to Allowing Lawyers to Hire FormerJurorsto
Work as Trial Consultantsin Retrials
Despite the criticism, one could argue that there are some potential

benefits to allowing lawyers to hire former jurors to work as trial
consultants in retrials. However, I argue that most of these "benefits"
do not outweigh the potential problems that this practice could create.7'
One argument is that allowing lawyers to receive feedback from jurors
is an "educational tool" that helps lawyers improve their skills and
better represent their clients in the future.72 While this may be true,

there are numerous less problematic ways for lawyers to improve their
skills,73 and several courts have held that lawyers should not use former
jurors for this purpose.74
69. Srisavasdi, supra note 1, at Locall (noting this potential problem raised by California
assemblyman Lou Correa).
70. Id.
71. See supra Part III.A-B.
72. Karlene S. Dunn, When Can An Attorney Ask: "What Were You Thinking?"Regulation of Attorney Post-Trial Communication With JurorsAfter Commission for Lawyer
Discipline v. Benton, 40 S.TEX. L. REV. 1069, 1079 n.47 (1999).
73. For example, lawyers can use a "shadow jury;" that is, a group of people who
observe the trial and fill out surveys at the end of each day. A shadow jury would arguably
give lawyers the same kind of feedback on their litigation skills that former jurors would give
them.
74. See, e.g., Haeberle v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1020 (5th Cir. 1984)
(denying a lawyer's request to "learn 'some lesson' about the basis for its verdict adverse to
his client"); In re Delgado, 306 S.E.2d 591, 594 (S.C. 1983) (holding that "[t]he argument that
counsel wishes to talk to a juror in an effort to improve his trial skills is more often an excuse
and not a good reason"); Sixberry v. Buster, 88 F.R.D. 561, 561 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that
a lawyer may not attempt to "improve his skills as a trial lawyer by ascertaining from the
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A second argument is that post-verdict contact between lawyers and
jurors is beneficial because it may lead to the discovery of evidence of
improper jury conduct, jury tampering, or other kinds of jury tainting. 5
Most courts have in fact agreed with this argument and do allow lawyers
in limited circumstances to question former jurors about jury
misconduct for the purpose of impeaching a verdict.
A third argument is that hiring former jurors to work as trial
consultants in retrials is just "good lawyering" on the part of defense
lawyers who have ethical obligations to make reasonable efforts to
defend their clients 7 Proponents argue that hiring former jurors does
not technically violate any ethical rules, and the possibility of a juror
intentionally deadlocking and creating a mistrial to secure a consulting
job in the retrial is very remote. 8 While it may be true that the practice
of lawyers hiring former jurors to work as trial consultants in retrials
does not technically violate any ethical rules, it will likely contribute to
the public's distrust in the jury system.79 Similarly, while it may be true
that the possibility of a juror intentionally deadlocking and creating a
mistrial to secure a consulting job in the retrial is very remote, the profit
motive in high-profile cases still exists and could potentially interfere
with criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights." The question,
then, is do we want to take this chance? Some courts and state
jurors which facets of the trial influenced their verdict").
75. Professor Goldstein has offered this description of "improper jury conduct:"
Under the most common formulation of the impeachment rule, jurors
may testify after the verdict only to "extraneous influences" on them...
includ[ing] illegal methods of decision, such as casting lots or being bound
by a majority vote; the use of personal knowledge, such as unauthorized
inspections of the scene of an accident or a crime; or expressions by the
judge of a desire for a conviction.
Goldstein, supra note 46, at 299.
76. See, e.g., King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 439 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that "a

district judge may provide that questioning of jurors after a verdict be conducted only under
supervision of the trial court"); United States v. Riley, 544 F.2d 237, 242 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977) (refusing to allow a lawyer to interview a former juror because
"interrogations of jurors have not been favored by federal courts except where there is some
showing of illegal or prejudicial intrusion into the jury process") (emphasis in original).
77. Curtis, supra note 3, at 1 (noting one lawyer's comment that "when you're being
prosecuted by the state, the state has so much power, and you're just a mere human being.
You have to make the scales a little more equal").
78. Id. (noting one lawyer's opinion that it is a "long shot" that a juror would
intentionally deadlock and create a mistrial to secure a consulting job in the retrial).
79. See supraPart III.A.2.
80. See supraPart III.B.3.
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legislatures have answered "no" and responded with laws restricting
post-verdict contact with jurors.
IV. PAST ATTEMPTS To RESTRICT POST-VERDICT CONTACT WITH
JURORS
When lawyers have hired former jurors to work as trial consultants
in retrials in the past, a great deal of publicity and debate about the legal
and ethical issues has resulted.81 Some federal courts, state courts, and
state legislatures have responded by restricting or completely
prohibiting post-verdict contact with jurors." However, almost all
complete prohibitions on post-verdict contact have now been repealed
on First Amendment grounds. 3

A. CourtAttempts to Restrict Post-Verdict Contact With Jurors
Courts have restricted three types of post-verdict contact with
former jurors: (1) interviews by lawyers for the purpose of obtaining
evidence of jury misconduct to impeach the verdict;8 (2) interviews by
81. See Goldhaber, supra note 10, at Al (discussing the reaction in the Florida legal
community after a former juror/lawyer joined the defense team in the retrial); Gombossy,
supra note 7, at 3 (discussing the reaction in the Connecticut legal community to the news
that defense lawyer Michael Sherman had hired a former juror to consult in a retrial).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 919 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding court
order banning post-verdict juror interviews concerning deliberations); United States v.
Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1115 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1041 (1984) (completely
prohibiting post-verdict contact with jurors). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 116.5 (West 1999)
(prohibiting anyone from compensating jurors or jurors from accepting compensation for
information about the trial within ninety days of the end of the trial); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 51-247(b) (West 2005) (prohibiting former jurors from receiving compensation for
consulting in a retrial or in a "separate trial arising out of the same transaction or offense").
83. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Hurley, 920 F.2d 88, 97-98 (1st Cir. 1990) (overruling
district court's ban on jurors talking to press and allowing for a ban only where "exceptional
circumstances peculiar to the case" exist); United States v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133, 1145
(N.D. Ind. 1982) (repealing complete ban on post-verdict interviews and modifying order to
prohibit jury interviews on the courthouse premises, post-verdict jury interviews by attorneys
and parties, and declaring that it is the jurors' own decision whether he or she chooses to
grant an interview). See also Dove Audio, 1995 WL 43261, at *1 (overruling section 116.5 of
the California Penal Code as it applied to jurors because it was overbroad).
84. See, e.g., King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 439 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that "a
district judge may provide that questioning of jurors after a verdict may be conducted only
under the supervision of the trial court" to obtain evidence of jury misconduct); United States
v. Riley, 544 F.2d 237, 242 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977) (refusing to allow
a lawyer to interview a former juror because "interrogations of jurors have not been favored
by federal courts except where there is some showing of illegal or prejudicial intrusion into

2005]

PROHIBITING JURORS

the media in high-profile cases for the purpose of informing the public
about the specific trial or about a "day in the life" of a juror;85 and (3)
interviews by lawyers for the purpose of improving the lawyer's skills or
effectiveness, whether in a retrial or in future unrelated trials.8 Courts
have taken several different approaches on the issue of post-verdict
contact with jurors, struggling to achieve a balance between protecting
criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and an
impartial jury while protecting lawyers', jurors', and the media's First
Amendment right to free speech. 7
One such approach taken by an increasing number of courts is to
completely ban post-verdict juror contact.m Another approach is to
prohibit post-verdict juror contact unless the juror consents, 9 the
the jury process") (emphasis in original).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that
post-verdict media interviews with jurors that discuss deliberations are prohibited, but
discussing general reactions is allowed); United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1364 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding that jurors may choose to give interviews with the media post-verdict, but they
may not discuss the opinions of other deliberating jurors); State v. Neulander, 801 A.2d 255,
259 (N.J. 2002), cert. denied., 537 U.S. 1192 (2003) (holding that the media is prohibited from
contacting former jurors for post-verdict interviews and former jurors are also prohibited
from contacting the media).
86. See, e.g., Haeberle v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1020 (5th Cir. 1984)
(denying a lawyer's request to "learn 'some lesson' about the basis for its verdict adverse to
his client"); In re Delgado, 306 S.E.2d 591, 594 (S.C. 1983) (holding that "[t]he argument that
counsel wishes to talk to a juror in an effort to improve his trial skills is more often an excuse
and not a good reason"); Sixberry v. Buster, 88 F.R.D. 561, 561 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that
a lawyer may not attempt to "improve his skills as a trial lawyer by ascertaining from the
jurors which facets of the trial influenced their verdict").
87. For example, in Journal Publ'g Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986),
the Tenth Circuit struggled to achieve a balance between protecting Sixth Amendment and
First Amendment rights. The court held that it "must narrowly tailor any prior restraint and
must consider any reasonable alternatives to that restraint which have a lesser impact on First
Amendment rights." Id.
88. See State v. Neulander, 801 A.2d 255, 259 (N.J. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1192
(2003) (affirming a trial court order prohibiting the media from contacting or interviewing
jurors, and prohibiting the media from releasing the identity or descriptions of jurors); see
also Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mely, 219 F.2d 199, 202 (9th Cir. 1954) (holding that "it is
improper and unethical for lawyers... to interview jurors to discover what was the course of
deliberation of a trial jury"); Sixberry v. Buster, 88 F.R.D. 561, 562 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding
that "[i]f the purpose of counsel is the improvement of his capabilities as a trial attorney,
which is a desirable and most laudable endeavor, unfortunately the court does not feel that
granting this motion would further that worthy ambition"); Florida Bar v. Newhouse, 498 So.
2d 935, 936 (Fla. 1986) (holding that "[t]he post-trial questioning of jurors concerning the
thought processes, calculations, or judgments involved in jury deliberations can only serve to
hamper the effective administration of justice").
89. For example, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Hurley, 920 F.2d 88, 90 (1st Cir. 1990), the
trial judge issued the following statement to jurors:

194

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[89:179

contact is for a lawful purpose,' or the lawyer receives permission from
the court.9' And yet another approach taken by at least one court is to
allow post-verdict contact if the juror has not been subjected to
repeated requests for interviews that could be considered harassment or
an invasion of the juror's privacy.'
The issue of post-verdict contact with former jurors has often been
raised in the context of post-verdict media interviews of jurors in highprofile cases. 93 These cases illustrate the conflict between criminal
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury,
the media's First Amendment right to gather and distribute information
to the public, jurors' rights to privacy, and traditional expectations of
secrecy in jury deliberations.94
For example, in State v. Neulander95 the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that media interviews with deadlocked jurors after a mistrial should

Members of the jury, the press may call you. It is up to you whether to
speak with them. My suggestion is this, though: These are very grave
matters. You have deliberated as a body, in confidence, and it is best that
the result of your deliberations shall remain in confidence.
Id.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 666 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that in the
"unusual" case where a "series of events occurred at trial that support a reasonable suspicion
that the jury may have been corrupted[,] [a]n inquiry is certainly warranted").
91. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 380 F. Supp. 1260, 1266 (N.D. Tex. 1973)
(allowing a defense lawyer to interview jurors "before the [c]ourt, in the presence of the
United States Attorney, with the juror under oath and his testimony being recorded by the
court reporter" because of allegations of jury misconduct).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1115, 1118 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1041 (1984) (holding that a ban on repeated requests for interviews was not
an abuse of discretion by the trial judge).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 921 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that
jurors have a right to have their names and addresses kept confidential post-verdict in highprofile cases unless they consent otherwise); United States v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267, 270
(5th Cir. 1997) (holding that post-verdict media interviews with jurors that discuss
deliberations are prohibited, but discussing general reactions is allowed); United States v.
Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1364 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that jurors may choose to give interviews
with the media post-verdict, but they may not discuss the opinions of other deliberating
jurors); United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 666 (2d Cir. 1978) (reversing a complete ban on
post-verdict interviews of former jurors by the media and reserving the complete ban only in
highly publicized cases that end in a mistrial and are likely to be retried); State v. Neulander,
801 A.2d 255, 265 (N.J. 2002), cert. denied sub. nom., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. New
Jersey, 537 U.S. 1192 (2003) (holding that the media is prohibited from contacting former
jurors for post-verdict interviews, and former jurors are also prohibited from contacting the
media).
94. See generallyid.
95. 801 A.2d 255 (N.J. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1192 (2003).
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be restricted.96 In this case, the defendant, a former rabbi, was charged

with murder and conspiracy in connection with the death of his wife. 97
The defendant's trial was the subject of an enormous amount of media
coverage, which prompted the court to issue an order that imposed
several restrictions on the media during the trial.98

One restriction

prohibited the media from releasing the identity or the descriptions of
jurors, 99 and another prohibited the media from contacting or
interviewing jurors." The defendant's trial later ended in a mistrial and
the jurors were discharged. 1 Shortly afterwards, five reporters were
found in contempt of court for violating the order prohibiting juror
interviews.'02

The court agreed with the defendant's lawyer that

allowing the media to interview the jurors from the first trial could give
the prosecution an unfair advantage in the retrial if it was able to
determine areas in which its evidence or arguments were weak. 3

However, the court's main concern was one of judicial economy."° If
the jurors had provided enough information to give the prosecution an
unfair advantage, the defendant may have had a Sixth Amendment
issue for appeal if he had been convicted.' 5 In addition to restricting the

media from contacting jurors, the court prohibited jurors from
consenting to post-verdict interviews.' The Supreme Court refused to
96. Id. at 274.
97. Id. at 257.
98. Id. at 258.
99. "Paragraph 13 of the Order provides: 'Neither the identity nor descriptions that
would reasonably identify any juror may be publicized, in any way, unless authorized by
further order of this Court."' Id.
100. "Paragraph 15 of the Order provides: 'Media representatives shall not contact or
attempt to interview any juror or potential juror."' Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 279.
103. "The singular vice of disclosure of prior deliberations is its capacity for destroying
the ability of the jury on retrial to deliberate on the issue of guilt or innocence free of
extraneous influence." Id. at 259.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 272-73. Jurors often explain to the media why they deadlocked, which may
be enough information to give the prosecution an "unfair advantage." See Casarez, supra
note 67, at 517. In a study, Professor Casarez found that jurors explained their reasons for
deadlocking in seventy-four percent of interviews, many times pointing out specific evidence
as the reason. Id. In fact, Professor Casarez found that jurors are "much more likely to talk
about their deliberations after a mistrial." Id. at 520. Of the seventy-eight articles in her
study where jurors granted interviews after a mistrial, sixty-five percent specifically talked
about deliberations. Id.
106. Neulander, 801 A.2d at 265. The jurors in this case did not consent to the
interviews. In fact, it was the former jurors themselves who objected to being contacted by
the media and requested that the judge do something about it. Jurors were subjected to
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review the decision,' 7 and as one commentator has suggested, this result
"will surely invite other judges to limit or ban post-verdict interviews.""
In contrast with the Neulander Court, the Second Circuit Court
reversed a ban on all post-verdict juror interviews in United States v.
Moten.'
During the defendant's trial in this case, a juror was
discharged for misconduct and replaced by an alternate."0
The
defendant moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the jury was tainted,

seeking permission from the court to interview the former jurors as
evidence."'

The court held that the evidence suggested a "reasonable

suspicion" that the jury may have been tainted and, therefore, allowed
post-verdict interviews of the jurors.1 2 In addition, the court held that
one of the only circumstances in which a complete ban on post-verdict
interviews is appropriate is in "a publicized case which ends in a hung
jury and is likely to be retried."".3
The difference of opinion between the Neulander and the Moten
Courts illustrates the difficulty of balancing Sixth Amendment and First

Amendment rights when reviewing lower court orders that have
restricted post-verdict contact with former jurors. The state legislatures
in Connecticut and California have also had difficulty achieving this
balance.
B. State Law Attempts to Restrict Post-Verdict Contact With Jurors

Although several states have rules that in some way restrict postverdict contact with former jurors,"' this subpart focuses exclusively on

two states: Connecticut and California.
repeated phone calls, letters, and visits at home from the media. News vans were parked
outside their homes twenty-four hours a day, and the media repeatedly telephoned or emailed many former jurors' employers. In addition, one television station broadcast footage
of the jurors that included their faces, and the Philadelphia Inquirer published the name of
one of the jurors. Id. at 259.
107. Neulander, 801 A.2d at 255 (N.J. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1192 (2003).
108. Casarez, supra note 67, at 504.
109. 582 F.2d 654, 667 (2d Cir. 1978).
110. Id. at 657.
111. Id. at 658.
112. Id. at 666-67.
113. Id. at 666 (quoting from 8A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CRIMINAL RULES
31.08(1)(b), at 31-58 n.13 (2d ed. 1977)).
114. See, e.g., ALASKA RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.10 (2005); FLA. RULES PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4-3.5(d)(4) (2005); GA. CODE PROF'L RESP. R. 7-108(D) (2005); ILL. RULES
PROF'L CODUCr R. 3.5(d) (2005); MASS. RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.5(d) (2005); MINN.
RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.5(c) (2005); N.Y. CODE PROF'L RESP. DR 7-108(D) (2005).
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1. Connecticut
In 1986, Connecticut became the first state to pass a law specifically
prohibiting lawyers from hiring former jurors to work as trial
consultants in retrials.115 The Connecticut legislature passed this law in
response to criticism within the legal community after defense lawyer
Michael Sherman hired one of the five original jurors to work as a trial
consultant in the retrial of a high-profile rape case. 6 The effects of the
laws are twofold.
First, the law makes a juror who receives
compensation for advising or consulting in a retrial or in a separate trial
"arising out of the same transaction or offense involving the same or
different parties" liable for a misdemeanor."7 Second, the statute makes
a lawyer who hires a former juror liable for aiding and abetting a
misdemeanor, as well as for professional misconduct." 8
Connecticut's federal district courts have also taken steps to prohibit
lawyers from hiring former jurors to work as trial consultants in
retrials." 9 In 1987, they adopted a rule prohibiting post-verdict contact
of jurors by the parties or their lawyers "concerning the deliberations or
verdict of the jury or of any individual juror in any action before, during,
or after trial, except upon leave of Court which shall be granted only
upon the showing of good cause."'' 2 Significantly, the media is not
prohibited from post-verdict contact with jurors under this rule, nor are
lawyers prohibited from seeking evidence for the purpose of impeaching
a verdict.' 2' While Connecticut's state law and federal rule prohibiting
115. 1986 Conn. Pub. Acts 181 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-247(b) (West
2005)):

Prohibition on former juror serving as consultant: No person who serves
as a juror in the trial of an action shall, for consideration, advise or consult
with any party with respect to a subsequent retrial of such action or a
separate trial arising out of the same transaction or offense involving the
same or different parties. Any person who violates the provisions of this
section shall be guilty of class A misdemeanor.

Id.
116. See Gombossy, supra note 7, at 6. The prosecutor in that case originally asked the
judge to find the juror in contempt of court for violating her oath of confidentiality but the
judge refused. Id.
117. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-247(b).

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
D. CONN. L. CIv. R. 83.5 (2003-04).
Id.
See id. See also Goldstein, supra note 46, at 305-06 (for a complete discussion of the
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post-verdict contact between lawyers and jurors have endured over the
years, California's law has not.
2. California
In 1994, former California Governor Pete Wilson signed the BrownKopp Bill into law, which, among other things, placed several
restrictions on jurors from receiving compensation for discussing their
experiences.'22 In particular, the Brown-Kopp Act made hiring a former
juror for over fifty dollars within ninety days of the discharge of the jury
"jury tampering," a misdemeanor.'23 Under this law, both the jurors
who accepted compensation and the lawyers who offered to pay them
could be liable. 4 However, shortly after the Brown-Kopp Act went
into effect, two California judges severely restricted its application when
the California First Amendment Coalition ("CFAC") and a former O.J.
Simpson juror, who wrote a book about the case, challenged it on First
Amendment grounds.""
effects of this rule).
122. CAL. PENAL CODE §116.5 (West Supp. 2005), stating, in relevant part:
(a) A person is guilty of tampering with a jury when, prior to, or within 90
days of, discharge of the jury in a criminal proceeding, he or she does any
of the following:
(1) Confers, or agrees to confer, any payment or benefit upon a
juror or upon a third person who is acting on behalf of a juror in
consideration for the juror or third person supplying information in
relation to an action or proceeding.
(2) Acting on behalf of a juror, accepts or agrees to accept any
payment or benefit for himself or herself or for the juror in consideration
for supplying any information in relation to an action or proceeding.
(3) Acting on behalf of himself or herself, agrees to accept,
directly or indirectly, any payment or benefit in consideration for
supplying any information in relation to an action or proceeding.
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(c) In the case of a juror who is within 90 days of having been discharged,
otherwise lawful compensation not exceeding fifty dollars ($50) in value
shall not constitute a criminal violation of this section.
Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See California First Amendment Coalition v. Lungren, No. C 95-0440-FMS, 1995
WL 482066, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1995) (holding that section 132.5 of the California Penal
Code and section 1669.7 of the California Civil Code as they applied to witnesses selling their
stories were unconstitutional); Dove Audio, Inc. v. Lungren, No. CV 95-2570 RG (JRX),
1995 WL 432631, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 1995) (holding that section 116.5 of the California
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The recently proposed Jury Integrity Act was more limited in its
scope than the Brown-Kopp Act, specifically prohibiting lawyers from
paying former jurors for serving as trial consultants and prohibiting
former jurors from receiving compensation at the end of a trial. 16 If
successful, this proposed rule would have effectively balanced the
interests of jurors, lawyers, the media, and the courts, while protecting
their constitutional rights, as discussed below in Part V.
V. BALANCING THE FIRST AMENDMENT WITH THE SIXTH

AMENDMENT: A PROPOSED RULE

This Part recommends an approach, similar to California's proposed
Jury Integrity Act, that furthers the policies behind restrictions on postverdict contact with jurors while respecting lawyers' and jurors' First
Amendment right to free speech and criminal defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury. All states should
adopt a rule that encompasses the following.
Any rule restricting post-verdict contact with jurors should prohibit
jurors from receiving compensation for working as consultants in the
retrial or in any trial arising out of the first trial. "Compensation"
should include both monetary and non-monetary forms.1 27 Jurors may
work as trial consultants without compensation if they so choose.
"Consulting" should include, but not be limited to, the following:
assisting in voir dire, discussing deliberations, giving any information
about other jurors, producing visual aids, preparing witnesses, drafting
prospective juror questionnaires, conducting focus groups and mock
trials, completing community surveys, and handling settlement
discussions.12 The rule should have an unlimited duration.
This proposed rule, if adopted, is narrow enough that it is unlikely
that a court would overturn it on constitutional grounds. In addition,
the punishment for breaking this proposed rule is strict enough that it is
unlikely that lawyers and jurors will disregard it. And finally, the
Penal Code was unconstitutionally overbroad as it applied to a dismissed Simpson case juror).
126. See H.R. 473, 2003-2004 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (proposed
amendment to section 116.5 of the California Penal Code), availableat http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/billinfo.html.
127. "Compensation" is defined as "[r]enumeration and other benefits received in
return for services rendered; esp., salary or wages." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 118 (2d
Pocket ed. 2001).
128. See Yarbrough, supra note 20, at 1889-95 (discussing conduct that could be defined
as "trial consulting").
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conduct prohibited by this proposed rule effectively protects criminal
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury.
First, the conduct prohibited under this proposed rule is narrow
enough that it is unlikely that a court would overturn it on constitutional
grounds. The Supreme Court uses a two-step analysis to review First
Amendment claims.12 9 First, the Court considers whether the regulation
restricts the "communicative or non-communicative impact of the
A regulation that restricts content is
expressive activity.1'030
unconstitutional unless the state shows that it serves "compelling state
interests.' 13' A regulation that does not restrict content is constitutional
unless it "unduly hampers the flow of information."'32 The Brown-Kopp
Act was a content-based restriction on communication. "3 It did not
effectively balance the First and Sixth Amendments; instead, it was
"unconstitutionally overbroad in that it regulate[d] more speech than
[was] necessary to serve the government's underlying interest."'" 3
Although California undeniably has a compelling state interest in
protecting criminal defendants' rights to a fair trial and an impartial
jury, the Brown-Kopp Act did more than just protect these Sixth
Amendment rights-it crossed the line and interfered with jurors',
lawyers', and the media's First Amendment right to free speech.
Like the Brown-Kopp Act, this proposed rule is a content-based
restriction of jurors', lawyers', and the media's communications. Also
like the Brown-Kopp Act, this proposed rule protects a compelling state
interest: the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants to a fair
trial and an impartial jury. Unlike the Brown-Kopp Act, however, the
proposed rule is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
As discussed in Part IV, broad prohibitions on post-verdict juror
contact have often been overturned by the courts.'35 The proposed rule
is not overbroad because it specifically targets only a juror's financial
motivations to intentionally deadlock and create a mistrial to secure a
consulting job in the retrial. Jurors may do a number of things under
the proposed rule, some of which were prohibited under the Brown129. Recent Legislation, Criminal Procedure-Witnessesand Jurors-CaliforniaEnacts
Ban on Receipt of Money For Information-Act of September 26, 1994, 108 HARV. L. REV.

1214, 1216 (1995).
130. Id. at 1216 n.15.
131. Id. at 1216 n.16.
132. Id. at 1216 n.17.
133. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 116.5 (West. 1995).
134. Recent Legislation, supra note 129, at 1218.
135. See supra Part IV.
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Kopp Act. First, jurors may speak to the media post-verdict, as well as
receive compensation for writing books and appearing on television
shows. Second, jurors may be interviewed post-verdict by lawyers under
the direction of the court for the purpose of gathering evidence to
impeach a verdict. And third, jurors may work as trial consultants in
retrials without compensation. By broadly defining "compensation,"
the proposed rule ensures that lawyers cannot avoid liability by offering
jurors non-monetary compensation, unlike the Brown-Kopp Act which
defined "compensation" as any amount over fifty dollars. And by
having an unlimited duration, the proposed rule ensures that lawyers
may not avoid liability by arranging for the retrial to occur after the
proscribed period of time, such as the ninety-day period under the
Brown-Kopp Act. Thus, the conduct prohibited by the proposed rule is
narrow enough that it is unlikely that a court would overturn it on
constitutional grounds, but still broad enough to be effective.
Second, the punishment for breaking this proposed rule is strict
enough that lawyers and jurors are unlikely to disregard it. As one
commentator has noted, "gag orders" issued by judges are often
ineffective.136 Making it a crime for lawyers to compensate jurors or for

jurors to accept compensation is likely enough of a threat to deter them
from disregarding the proposed rule. 3 ' In addition, the proposed
punishment under the rule is not so harsh that it violates the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.'
Third, the conduct that this proposed rule prohibits effectively
protects criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and
an impartial jury. Several courts have held that these rights are so
important that when a criminal defendant has been deprived of them,
his or her conviction should be reversed. 9 Some courts have even held
136. Casarez, supra note 67, at 584-85. For example, in one case involving American
Airlines, the judge issued a gag order on the jurors, prohibiting them from discussing the case
with anyone except their families for forty-five days. Two jurors talked to the press on the
day of the verdict, and the press did not wait until the end of the forty-five days to publish the
jurors' comments. Id.
137. Since section 54-247 of the Connecticut General Statutes was enacted, no reported
cases in Connecticut exist in which a lawyer was prosecuted for hiring former jurors to work
as trial consultants in the retrial.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (providing that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted").
139. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 354-57, 363 (1966) (reversing court's
denial of defendant's habeas petition where the media severely interfered with his right to a
fair trial); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (reversing and remanding defendant's
conviction where the media severely interfered with his Fourteenth Amendment due process
right).
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that the possibility of unfairness should be prevented.'40 For example,
the Supreme Court has gone so far as to suggest that there are times
when criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights should trump
others' First Amendment right. 141 In Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart, 42 the Court stated that "[ilt is not asking too much to suggest that
those who exercise First Amendment rights in newspapers or
broadcasting enterprises direct some effort to protect the rights of an
accused to a fair trial by unbiased jurors.' ' 43 Just as it is not asking too
much of the media to make reasonable efforts to protect criminal
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights, it is not asking too much of
lawyers and former jurors to make reasonable efforts to protect criminal
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
VI. CONCLUSION

Trial consultants, while growing more commonplace and accepted
among lawyers and the general public, are still controversial. The
practice of lawyers hiring former jurors to work as trial consultants in
retrials has added fuel to the fire. The prospect that a juror might
change his or her vote to secure a consulting position in a retrial is a
very real threat to criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a
fair trial and an impartial jury. These rights can be protected only by
laws that prohibit former jurors from accepting compensation to work
as trial consultants in retrials.
Connecticut took our nation's first step towards protecting these
rights with the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1986. Since then, only
California has attempted to follow this lead, an attempt that first failed
as a result of its overbroad restriction on the First Amendment right to
free speech. California's recently proposed Jury Integrity Act, upon
which my proposed rule is based, is not overbroad, but it is not cost-free
either. However, it restricts the First Amendment right of jurors only to
the extent necessary to prevent the possibility of an unfair and partial
140. Justice Black has stated: "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our
system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness .... In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
141. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1976).
142. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
143. Id. at 560. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972) (suggesting that the
press "may be prohibited from attending or publishing information about trials if such
restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal").
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jury, a restriction that has been approved by the Supreme Court.'44

The purpose of this Comment is to make those who are unaware of
the practice of lawyers hiring former jurors to work as trial consultants
in retrials familiar with the potential First and Sixth Amendment
problems that may result from any restrictions on these rights. There
are, of course, likely to be critics who will dismiss these potential
problems, arguing that hiring former jurors to work as trial consultants
in retrials is "creative lawyering" that is not technically unethical, and
that the possibility that a juror will intentionally deadlock and create a
mistrial to secure a consulting job in the retrial is a "long shot." My
question to these critics is this: With all the juror biases and all the
hidden motives that interfere with criminal defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights in our jury system today, are we really willing to risk
adding a profit motive?
SARAH A. ZAWADA

144. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976); In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
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